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 Local sourcing, Arctic seaways and fossil fuel intolerance lessen oil freight work.
 Oil hauls lengthen if ships re-route to avoid Emission Control Areas and piracy.
 Conservative perceptions of established specialists match early career views.
 Carbon emission reduction policies imply significantly reduced oil shipments.
 Attitude change in maritime professionals will require education and marketing.
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a b s t r a c t
This paper aims to synthesise maritime specialists' perceptions of changing patterns of maritime oil
freight flows to 2050. Debate spans published maritime oil flows globally, diverse drivers of future flows
including economic growth, shipping market changes and haul lengths. A classic Delphi study to explore
the perceptions of likely trends and flows to 2050 recruited a panel of early career and established
maritime specialists, many with long term career commitments to this industry. Underpinned by market
volatility and legislative uncertainty, the perceptions of both groups coincided and were conservative.
Local sourcing, new Arctic seaways and fossil fuel intolerance will tend to reduce oil freight work but
perceptions of ship re-routing to avoid for example Emission Control Areas and piracy would tend to
lengthen hauls. In advanced industrial nations, reducing energy intensities and diminishing social
tolerance of fossil fuels imply gradually reducing maritime oil shipments. However, to achieve radical
national commitments to carbon emissions reductions will necessitate specialist education for naturally
conservative maritime professionals and vigorous oil import reduction policies to curtail domestic
demand for oil shipments.
& 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
This paper aims to analyse perceptions of changing patterns of
maritime oil freight flows to 2050, by synthesising the opinions of
maritime specialists. It features tankers as the ship type which
generates the highest total volumes of CO2 emissions (Buhaug
et al., 2009), crude oil and oil products flows. Global patterns,
dependent on world demand stimulated by regional surpluses and
deficits, define tanker loading and discharge areas. The demand for
shipping crude oil and oil products derives from macro-economic
demands for shipping which vary with global economic activity
and the dynamic role of shipping in moving raw materials, semi-
processed or finished products in fluctuating supply chains.
Because measures of demand for shipping freight work combine
tonnage lifted (t) and distance hauled (km), changes in both affect
demand in tonne-kilometres (tkm). Apparent reductions in
demand for wet bulk freight work may reflect economic reversals,
reducing oil intensities in production processes as technical
advances require less oil to produce a given output, or shorter
hauls arising from localised oil sourcing, pipeline construction or
rerouting via canal upgrades.
Subject to inevitable physical measurement errors (Dinwoodie
and Bhatia, 2004), global flow data emanate from official (e.g. EC,
2008) and private sources including BP's Statistical Review and
Energy Outlook (www.bp.com), Exxon Mobil's Outlook for Energy
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(www.exxonmobil.com) and Shell's Energy Scenarios (www.shell.
com), as do national data (e.g. EIA, 2011; DfT, 2010; Dukes, 2011;
MDS Transmodal Limited, 2007). Regional surpluses and deficits of
crude oil create tanker loading and discharging areas which
determine the spatial patterns of 1895Mt of flows annually
(Table 1; BP, 2012) with Europe, the US and increasingly South
East, East and South Asia in deficit, and the Middle East Gulf
(MEG), Former Soviet Union (FSU), North and West Africa, Central
and South America and Canada in surplus. Although Europe,
Singapore, the US and Asia Pacific regions import oil products
extensively, 791 Mt traded annually (BP, 2012) engages all regions
including African crude producing areas. MEG dominates oil
products exports but importing regions also export following
further refining. Major crude oil flows ex-MEG often route via
the Cape of Good Hope or Suez Canal to Europe and the US. Suez
Canal maximum sizes (Suezmax) vary with dredging, although
some larger vessels transit Suez in ballast on backhauls after
offloading MEG-Europe cargoes shipped fully-laden via the Cape
of Good Hope, or awaiting cargoes from the SUMED pipeline. MEG
also exports crude oil to India, Pakistan, Japan and China. As
currently the largest single consumer and importer of oil, the US
receives shipments ex-MEG and South America, including Vene-
zuela, Brazil and Columbia, to US Gulf (USG) and US East Coast
(USEC). Many movements of crude oil imports to USG and the
Caribbean Sea, followed by exports of products, require lightering
and transhipment at terminals which are draft restricted. Other
major flows in Asia include the distribution of crude and products
ex-FSU to Continental Europe, and onward to USG/USEC. Refineries
in Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines which export products
are supplied by crude imports from Indonesia and MEG. Indonesia
also exports crude oil and gas to China, Japan, Singapore, and
Korea. In the Mediterranean and Black Sea area, crude oil flows
ex-FSU, Libya and Algeria, and Iraqi oil transfers through Ceyhan
terminal in Turkey. Product cargoes flow ex-Italy, Spain and
France.
Tanker flows remain relatively concentrated but increasing ship
sizes (Lindstad et al., 2012) have necessitated more offshore
terminal developments of loading and discharging facilities which
may include floating storage vessels to release land for refining. In
the North Sea and elsewhere, offshore oil production generates
offshore transfers from production vessels or an undersea oil
production facility. Accumulated atmospheric emissions from
tankers queuing to enter ports near urban areas may influence
decisions to establish Emissions Control Areas (ECA; IMO, 2013).
Reviews identified eight key drivers of maritime tanker
demand (D1…D6). Demand estimates (D1) vary inter alia with
demand for total freight transport, dependant on: population and
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth, production and location
decisions; sensitivity to shipping costs including bunker prices
(D2) which influence routing (D3) and maritime mode shares
(D4); sourcing policies; and haul lengths (D5–D6; Stopford, 2009).
The paper reviews these drivers before discussing the methodol-
ogy and results of a classic Delphi survey of expected likely trends
in tanker freight flows to 2050. Discussion notes that although
volatile markets, behavioural uncertainties and prospective legis-
lation explain conservative predictions which imply a business as
usual philosophy, vigorous carbon emissions reduction policies
may supersede gradual behavioural trends towards fossil fuel
reduction.
2. Drivers of maritime oil flows
2.1. Some drivers and forecasts of future demand
Oil freight flows vary with the supply and demand for crude oil
and oil products, which depend on the demand for transport,
traditionally related to GDP. Predictions of when oil demand will
peak include “by 2020” if links with GDP are weak (Aleklett et al.,
2010); “likely by 2030, with a significant risk pre-2020” (Sorrell
et al., 2010); “post-2020”, in Shell's (2008) Scramble scenario in
which climate shocks necessitate oil substitution; and “post-2040”
Table 1
Percentage of global oil imports and exports. Source: adapted from BP (2012).
Region Crude oil Oil products
Imports Exports Imports Exports
US 24 0 15 15
Canada 1 6 2 3
South and Central America 1 11 12 7
Europe 24 1 17 11
Former Soviet Union 0 17 1 14
Middle East 1 45 1 13
Africa 1 17 5 4
China 13 0 10 4
India 9 0 1 5
Japan 9 0 6 2
Singapore 3 0 12 11
Other Asia Pacific 14 3 18 11
Table 2
Selected forecast changes (CAR) Source: adapted from the source stated.
Area, variable, scenario From 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2040
To 2015 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050
Global Source
Oil consumption: scramble Shell, 2008 0.57 0.57 0.38 0.38 1.06 1.19
Oil consumption: blueprints Shell, 2008 0.79 0.79 0.05 0.05 0.26 1.60
Oil production BP (2012) 0.89 0.89 0.58 0.58
Oil consumption BP (2012) 0.61 0.61 0.38 0.38
Oil consumption EM, 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.40 0.40
GDP non-OECD EM, 2012 5.00 5.00 5.00 3.80 3.80
Europe
EU GDP EM, 2012 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.60 1.60
Europe/Eurasia oil consumption BP (2012) 0.14 0.00 0.04 0.15
Europe/Eurasia oil production BP (2012) 0.10 0.08 0.14 0.06
OECD Europe EIA (2011) 1.08 0.77 0.32 0.05 0.16
Oil consumption, base case
Low oil price EIA (2011) 0.02 0.19 0.19 0.41 0.41
High oil price EIA (2011) 1.77 1.25 1.25 0.05 0.05
OECD Europe conventional production, base case EIA (2011) 4.55 3.15 1.13 0.37 0.31
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in ExxonMobil's model where GDP growth in developing countries
escalates demand (www.bp.com; www.exxonmobil.com) (Table 2).
By 2030, Lloyd's Register (2013) estimate that oil demand in China
will be triple US demand in 2011. At supra-national scales, base
case estimates of 2.0% Compound Annual Rate (CAR) real GDP
growth for OECD Europe to 2030 range from 1.6% with low growth
to 2.5% with high growth (EIA, 2011). Longer term forecasts predict
reducing European GDP growth and energy consumption and EU
demand for freight transport decoupling from GDP growth as
economies dematerialise and populations stagnate. European oil
production will decline (EC, 2008; EIA, 2011). Hammer (2009)
observed that global oil tanker tonnage in 2008 was unchanged
since 1978 but will this continue (D1a, D1b)? Future changes in oil
intensity, which measures oil used per unit of output and has
halved in industrial nations in 30 years, are also debateable (D1c,
D1d; Osler 2010).
Within Europe, predicted 9% CAR base case declines in UK
North Sea oil production (DTi, 2007) will diminish GB crude oil
exports and raise imports (MDS Transmodal, 2007), but rates will
vary with investment and taxation policy (Nakhle, 2007). Ton-
nages shipped ashore will decline but maritime market shares will
rise as fewer pipeline networks serve increasingly remote small oil
field developments. Indeed, carbon storage in redundant North
Sea oilfields may generate new ship movements if technically
robust low-emission vessels develop to transport captured carbon
emerge (Mander et al., 2012). The UK Stern Review linked per
capita GDP with CO2 emissions and proposed a hypothetical
relationship between income and local pollutants, defined by
environmental Kuznets curves. Beyond a certain point, rising per
capita incomes stimulate local abatement incentives and appro-
priate political and regulatory mechanisms to control pollutants
(Her Majesty's Treasury, 2006, p. 191). Eventually declining energy
intensities will reduce oil demand in Western Europe (EC, 2008),
as may perceptions of speculative Kuznets curve behavioural
effects as intolerance to fossil fuels grows (Verbruggen and Al
Marchohi, 2010).
2.2. Bunker prices and shipping market changes
Principles underpinning the economic analysis of shipping
markets are well documented (Stopford, 2009) and sectoral
models of particular ship types (Glen, 2006) now predominate.
Specialist markets and devices designed to manage extensive
operational risks including pooling agreements (Gilje et al.,
2002) and hedging instruments (Dinwoodie and Morris, 2003)
testify to the volatility of oil supply chains. Estimates of the long
and short run impacts of bunker price changes on maritime freight
rates (D2a, D2b) underpin numerous maritime policies. Given that
shipping costs comprise only 4% of crude oil import values
(Korinek and Sourdin, 2009), worldwide demand for maritime
transportation of oil and freight rates have been relatively inelastic
to bunker price changes (UNCTAD, 2010). Similarly any potential to
cut shipping emissions using market-based reduction measures
including bunker levies (Miola et al., 2011) depends on freight rate
to bunker price elasticities, which if high, would favour local
sourcing, pipeline transportation and reduced demand for mar-
itime transportation.
Perceptions of how particular developments in ships and
shipping markets will affect total demand are crucial. As climate
change heightens drought risks, will more tankers be deployed as
water carriers (D3a; Hammer, 2009)? Similarly, how will shor-
tened sea routes arising from Arctic ice-melt (D3b, D3c; Ho, 2010)
or an enlarged Panama Canal (D3d, D3e; Stott and Wright, 2012)
impact demand for tanker freight work? Regulations now under-
pin ship design to encourage improvements in new ship fuel
consumption, after the International Maritime Organisation (IMO)
introduced an Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI; IMO, 2013;
MEPC.1/Circ.681) specifying minimum levels and promoting on-
going technical development by enabling a comparison between
similar individual ships. How will a mandatory baseline index to
provide a transparent basis for comparison, regularly updated to
reflect technological changes, affect maritime transportation (D3f,
D3g)? Also, how will rising demand for new fuels including LNG
and nuclear power affect total tanker demand (D3h, D3i)?
Future demand for wet bulk maritime transportation will also
depend on perceptions of how pipeline investments will impact oil
import mode splits as more pipelines link Canadian tar sands with
the US (D4a, D4b), Russian and MEG oilfields with Europe (D4c,
D4d), and MEG and Russian oilfields with China (D4e, D4f;
Hammer, 2009).
2.3. Haul lengths
If rising bunker costs induce localised or regionalised oil
sourcing with shortened supply chains, global average maritime
haul lengths will reduce (D5a; Hammer, 2009). Further, regula-
tions which influence the type of fuel that ships may consume in
particular areas and undefined future ECA designations could
promulgate ship re-routing to avoid them (D5b, D5c). A 1973
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships was modified by IMO Protocol in 1978, creating MARPOL
73/78. In 1997, Annex VI, Regulations for the Prevention of Air
Pollution from Ships, was adopted. Enforced in May 2005 this
regulated the mass/mass of sulphur content for marine fuel oil to
control sulphur oxide (SOx) emissions from ships (IMO, 2013).
Sulphur ECAs in the North Sea, Baltic Sea and North America cost-
effectively cut ship-originated air pollution (Wang and Corbett,
2007) and were extended to include other emissions, but future
developments and their impacts remain unknown. To reduce
carbon emissions, an Energy Efficiency Operational Index (EEOI)
for ships in operation compares the energy efficiency (CO2 per
tkm) of a specific ship against others of its type. A Ship Energy
Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) incorporates best practice
relating to voyage planning, optimal speed (Lindstad et al., 2011),
power and handling, cargo handling and fleet and energy manage-
ment. The EEOI and SEEMP imply shorter hauls to reduce freight
work (D5d, D5e; IMO, 2013). However, multi-sourcing strategies to
ensure secure energy supplies may also imply changed haul
lengths (D5f).
Useful indicative specialist perceptions of changing specific
average haul lengths include the effects of Arctic ice-melt in
creating Northwest (NW) and Northeast (NE) passages on routes
such as NE Asia–W. Europe (D6a, D6b, Parsons et al., 2011; Ho,
2010) or an enlarged Panama Canal on NE Asia–US E. Coast routes
(D6c, D6d; Stott and Wright, 2012). Conversely, if droughts
induced by climate change create more failed states and foster
piracy, suboptimal routing to avoid trouble spots may lengthen
maritime hauls (D6e; Osler, 2010).
3. Methodology
3.1. Study design
Secondary maritime commodity flow data proved insufficient
to investigate debateable issues, being either unavailable or
incomparable (Glen and Marlow, 2009). Changing classifications
in aggregate trade flow data frustrated serial commodity compar-
isons, where official UK oil products flow data incorporated
liquefied gas until 2000 (DfT, 2010). Different spatial aggregations
frustrate comparisons of data collated for Great Britain (GB) and
the UK (MDS Transmodal Limited, 2007; DECC, 2009; DfT, 2010).
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Changing trading boundaries associated with EU expansion com-
pound problems. Tracking and apportioning flows is problematic
as vessel output measures span movements in national waters,
number of vessel arrivals and tonnes loaded at national ports
(Gilbert and Bows, 2012). Port commodity arrivals data which
typically fails to identify transhipment flows or an ultimate source
or destination hampers flow reporting. Accordingly, the drivers of
future tanker demand (D1:D6) were evaluated via research stra-
tegies such as canvassing specialists to build consensus rather than
forecasts based on scenarios of future developments, extrapolation
of past trends and analysis of historical patterns (Stopford, 2009;
Saaty and Boone, 1990). Longer term forecasts often deploy
scenario constructions built on opinion surveys (Petersen et al.,
2009; Schiffer, 2008; Lloyd's Register, 2013; Mander et al., 2012).
However, because this study aims to synthesise the perceptions of
maritime specialists it requires a technique to facilitate group
evaluations of statements rather than the construction of scenar-
ios. Delphi techniques are apposite because they facilitate remote
communication between panellists who are recruited to represent
key viewpoints (Linstone and Turoff, 1975) typically following
literature reviews which generate sets of initial statements.
Panellists' evaluations of statements and their responses are
iteratively fed back until consensus emerges.
This study sought to canvas specialists' opinions and synthesise
their perceptions of future demand for wet bulk shipping flows to
2030 and 2050. Stakeholder views span the owners, managers and
operators of ships; managers of ports, logistics and supply chain
systems; brokers, consultants, classification societies, insurers and
regulators. As a holistic interconnected system, international
shipping is too complex for one individual to comprehend and
individual stakeholder experiences uniquely colour conceptualisa-
tions of emerging trends and prospects. To achieve study objec-
tives by canvassing and probing specialists' perceptions of
emergent issues requires a survey technique capable of generating
consensus. Furthermore, rapid change, uncertainty and complex
multifaceted implementation issues necessitate a multidisciplin-
ary perspective which engages diverse knowledgeable experts.
A Delphi panel offers a structured technique which assists
researchers to understand the implications of changing opera-
tional environments, and empowers stakeholders to
communicate.
Delphi questioning facilitates asynchronous responses and can
accommodate geographically dispersed participants, including an
international panel. Aside from forecasting, applications suit
gathering data to explore logistics planning and potential policy
options (Linstone and Turoff, 1975; Cetin and Cerit, 2010; Makukha
and Grey, 2004; von der Gracht and Darkow, 2010). Applications to
energy policy include hybrid and mixed methods studies (Tavana
et al., 2012; LaBelle, 2012) and focus on divergent opinions
(Makkonen et al., 2012). However, an objective of synthesising
perceptions suits a “Classic” design to canvass opinions and
achieve consensus, varied slightly to process numerical data.
Delphi designs typically aim to ensure anonymity, controlled
feedback, iteration and participating experts (Linstone and
Turoff, 1975; Nowack et al., 2011; Landeta, 2006). Each panellist
remains anonymous to deny intra-panel communication and
prevent any bandwagon effects whereby one individual or view-
point may dominate or influence others. In this design, the mean
response on each statement was fed back to panellists who were
offered an opportunity to revise their initial evaluation. To tap
specialist expertise a Delphi panel was established to explore
controversial issues (D1:D6). The processes whereby the Delphi
instrument was derived, how panellists were selected, and the
administration and analysis of two rounds of Delphi (R1, R2) are
considered next.
3.2. The Delphi instrument
In this study, which is replicable, assurances of the internal
validity of the content, constructs and criteria deployed match
considerations of generalisability and external validity. Statements
in the Delphi instrument derived from the trade-press ensured
content-coincidence with the object of study. However, because
panellists did not generate these Delphi statements and the
validity of the constructs evaluated is not grounded in their
expertise, all statements offered an “unable to comment” option.
This also ensured that participation was voluntary. To ensure
criterion validity statements must correlate with an evaluation,
which may be compromised by high drop-out rates. To enhance
their awareness of this, R2 panellists were informed that non-
return would be assumed to represent confirmation of their initial
choices. Regarding external validity, although panellists' percep-
tions are inevitably influenced by contemporary events, short-
term market distortions have limited influence on long-term
perceptions (Piecyk and McKinnon, 2010). Aside from this, recruit-
ment of a committed panel of diverse stakeholders embracing
multiple nationalities and disciplinary interest maximises the
likelihood of achieving generalisability.
Recent shipping trade press articles which discussed issues
driving maritime oil flows (Dinwoodie et al., 2011) were refined
into draft statements (D1:D6). Eight shipping academics in four
universities specialising in engineering, logistics, geography, man-
agement and economics, tested their suitability for inclusion in a
Delphi survey. If feasible to canvass, the academics sought split-
period quantitative perceptions of developments 2010–2030 (“α”),
and from 2030 to 2050 (“β”) rather than 2010–2050 (“η”). Further,
given a 2050 perspective, they recommended a panel comprised of
substantial proportions of early career specialists with reasonable
expectations of maintaining long term industrial commitments, to
minimise non-commitment bias (Fowkes and Preston, 1991).
Following further refinements a pilot Delphi panel was convened
to test a draft online Qualtrics software survey instrument. On
many questions, panellists were offered modified Likert scales
incorporating an ‘unable to comment’ option to respond to
quantitative statements about their perceptions of developments
Table 3
Response levels and assumed midpoints.
Question Score 1 2 3 4 5
D1,D2 Level 450% Too high 25–50% Too high About right 25–50% Too low 450% Too low
Midpoint 0.60 0.73 1.00 1.37 1.67
D3 Level Fall 420% Fall 10–20% Change little Rise 10–20% Rise 420%
Midpoint 0.70 0.85 1.00 1.15 1.30
D5,D6 Level 425% shorter 10–25% Shorter Little changed 10–25% Longer 425% Longer
Midpoint 0.70 0.83 1.00 1.175 1.30
D4 Level Fall 450% Fall 25–50% Change little Rise 25–50% Rise 450%
Midpoint 0.60 0.73 1.00 1.37 1.67
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in α and β. In pilot surveys, several incomplete responses connoted
a shorter instrument and widespread non-response to β questions
necessitated merged η comparisons. Questions to estimate voyage
lengths explicitly requested estimates “averaged over all relevant
routes, ship sizes and types.” To estimate tonnages, elasticities and
proportions, operationally relevant groupings within 25, 50 and
67% of a central estimate were canvassed, reduced to 10, 20 and
30% for global demand, and 10, 25 and 35% for voyage length
estimates. Using these indicative class intervals to generate
assumed midpoints (Table 3) to facilitate computation of mean
estimates, mean α¼1.07 on question 1, a statement that tonnage
would remain unchanged, was considered 7% too low, implying
anticipated 7% tonnage growth to 2030.
3.3. Panel selection
To ensure content validity, Delphi panels should incorporate
knowledgeable and interested specialists who represent multi-
disciplinary stakeholder interests and viewpoints (Czinkota and
Ronkainen 1997; Qu et al., 2010). With a 2050 planning horizon
the study explicitly recruited specialist practitioners (group A), or
early career specialist postgraduates in shipping, logistics and
supply-chain management (group B), most with prior relevant
industrial experience and all with recent experience in compiling
reports investigating the complex and interrelated drivers of bulk
shipping demand (Alberts, 2007). Importantly, group B would be
instrumentally and industrially committed long-term towards
2050. Diverse panellists’ interests further enhanced the content
validity of the study, given that all participants were knowledge-
able about wet bulk shipping. Panel membership by invitation
only avoided any self-selection bias. Invitations to participate in
Group Awere emailed to 51 heads of either wet bulk or research at
shipping organisations listed in membership pages of the Institute
of Chartered Shipbrokers, plus 15 personal contacts, to widen
representation; five responded fully to the online R1 survey. After
some questions requesting β estimates were removed, follow-up
reminders in early 2012 generated six further responses. Invita-
tions to join group B were emailed to 85 specialists in December
2011 and following repeat invitations 24 completed the R1
instrument to supplement 11 practitioners. An overall joint invita-
tion to participation rate of 4.3 (23%), closely matches average
rates (Nowack et al., 2011).
Practitioner panellists included two consultant marine
researchers, a senior marine planner in a petroleum company,
managing director of an oil credit broker, manager of oil projects in
a major oil company, a senior oil credit analyst, one shipping
company managing director and one chief executive, a senior
market analyst, a classification society specialist, and a tanker
segment manager. When combined with Group B's specialist
interests, industrial experiences spanned procurement to logistics,
and panellists' professional interests embraced most wet bulk
shipping specialisations (Table 4), three continents, and experi-
ence of most professional interests and ship sizes.
3.4. Data collection and analysis
Invitations to participate were emailed because this method is
flexible, convenient and empowers response when convenient to
the recipient. Following two reminders, 35 R1 responses received
by March 2012 were analysed. To ensure credibility, personalised
R2 questionnaires were compiled, incorporating the individual's
R1 response, mean response and an invitation to respond finally
alongside an emboldened statement that non-return would be
presumed to represent confirmation of initial choices. These were
emailed to R1 respondents either as MS Word attachments or an
invitation to return an individualised Qualtrics questionnaire.
Following two reminders, 14 R2 responses received during March
were analysed, with 11 showing changes, an acceptable rate given
the explicit presumption that non-response represents continued
participation. Results are tabulated thematically (Tables 5–8) to
show R1 and R2 mean scores and the percentage fall in standard
deviation (s.d.) observed on all but four statements, which testifies
to increased consensus in R2.
The preferred statistic to test for differences in the central
tendency of the distributions of responses between various sub-
groupings was a non-parametric independent samples Mann–
Witney U-test. This statistic was selected because although visual
inspection of the histograms and normal Q–Q probability plots for
each variable for all sub-groups typically suggested normal
distributions, several variables exhibited some skewness.
Non-parametric comparisons were preferred, because although
inferential power is slightly reduced, this treatment ensured
consistency across all variables. Because comparisons between
Groups A and B revealed a statistically significant difference
(po0.05) only on D1a (Table 5) no further disaggregation was
undertaken. A further test for consistency between early and late
respondents compared the first quartile of early responses with
the last quartile. Because late respondents had been sent addi-
tional reminders, they may exhibit characteristics similar to those
of non-respondents (Piecyk and McKinnon, 2010). However, a
statistically significant difference (po0.05) between early and late
respondents on only one R1 variable, and none in R2 indicated
that non-response bias is unlikely.
4. Results
4.1. Perceived growth and tanker demand
Demand estimates for wet bulk shipping revealed that follow-
ing unchanged global tonnage since 1978, mean considered
responses anticipated limited growth (α¼7%, 0.34% CAR; β¼4%,
0.195% CAR). If the oil intensity of production in developed
economies continues to halve in 30 years, (2.29% CAR; Osler,
2010) then by 2030 current output levels would require 63% of
2010 oil consumption compared with panellists' considered esti-
mates of 64.4% (α¼2.176%) reducing to 40.9% (β¼2.241% CAR)
by 2050. If panellists are correct, given comparable current oil
consumption totals in OECD and non-OECD economies, 2010
Table 4
Profile of Delphi panellists.
Characteristic Group Percentage of
panellists
Nationality Asia 34
Non-UK Europe 34
UK 22
Africa 10
Main professional interest Miscellaneous supply
chain
35
Logistician 31
Researcher 19
Government or
regulation
6
Ship owner 3
Port manager 3
Shipbroker 3
Ship size currently engage
with
Various 48
Suezmax 29
Very large 11
Panamax (2011) 6
Handysize 6
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Table 5
Freight demand and rates elasticity estimates.
D1. How accurate are the following freight demand estimates for wet bulk shipping?
Response scores: No reply Mean Mean % Fall in s.d.
1¼450% too high; 2¼25–50% too high; 3¼about right; 4¼25–50% too low; 5¼450% too low. R1 R2
D1a. Global wet bulk tonnage will remain unchanged 2010–2030. 2 1.08 1.07 8
D1b…. and in 2030–2050 5 1.06 1.04 4
D1c. The quantity of oil used in each unit of industrial output in developed economies
will halve in 30 years pro rata from 2010 to 2030
0 0.96 0.95 13
D1d. …and in 2030–2050 3 1.02 1.03 10
D2. How accurate are the following estimates of wet bulk freight rates changes in relation to bunker price changes?
D2a. In the long run the spot freight rate for oil will rise 20% if bunker fuel prices double in real terms 4 1.10 1.08 12
D2b. In the short run the spot freight rate for oil will rise 20% if bunker fuel prices double in real terms 4 0.98 0.96 4
Table 6
Drivers of global demand.
D3. How will solely the driver shown affect total global demand (tkm) for wet bulk maritime transport?
Response scores: No reply Mean Mean % Fall in s.d.
1¼fall 20þ%; 2¼ fall 10–20%; 3¼change little; 4¼rise 10–20%; 5¼rise 20þ% R1 R2
D3a More demand for water carriers will cause tkm from 2010 to 2050 to: 2 1.11 1.11 2
D3b. Shorter sea routes due to Arctic ice-melt will cause tkm 2010–2030 to: 0 0.97 0.98 4
D3c …and 2030–2050? 2 1.00 1.00 4
D3d. An enlarged Panama canal will cause tkm 2010–2030 to: 1 1.02 1.03 7
D3e …and 2030–2050? 2 1.00 1.03 11
D3f. IMO Energy Efficiency Design Index regulations which require ships to
emit less carbon will cause tkm 2010–2030 to:
1 0.94 0.95 9
D3g…and 2030–2050? 3 0.93 0.94 0
D3h Rising demand for LNG will cause tkm 2010–2050 to: 2 1.05 1.04 3
D3i. Changed demand for nuclear power will cause tkm 2010–2050 to: 3 0.95 0.96 10
Table 7
Some modal split estimates.
D4. Solely because of more oil pipelines the proportion of the specified oil imports moved in ships will:
Response scores: No reply Mean Mean % fall in s.d.
1¼fall 50þ%; 2¼ fall 25–50%; 3¼change little; 4¼rise 25–50%; 5¼rise 50þ% R1 R2
D4a. Oil pipelines linking the US to Canadian tar sands, will cause the % of US oil imports moved
in ships from 2010 to 2030 to:
0 0.93 0.93 6
D4b…and 2030–2050? 2 0.87 0.88 7
D4c. More oil pipelines from MEG to Europe and Russia will cause the % of European oil imports
moved in ships 2010–2030 to:
0 0.98 0.96 10
D4d…and 2030–2050? 2 0.94 0.92 13
D4e. More oil pipelines from MEG to China and Russia will cause the % of China's oil imports moved in ships 2010–2030 to: 1 1.00 0.96 14
D4f…and 2030–2050? 3 0.97 0.96 16
Table 8
Voyage length estimates.
D5. How will solely the driver shown affect the global average voyage length of wet bulk hauls (km)?
Response scores: 1¼25þ% shorter; 2¼10–25% shorter; 3¼ little changed; 4¼10–25% longer; 5¼25þ% longer No
reply
Mean Mean % Fall in s.d.
R1 R2
D5a. Rising bunker costs by favouring sources close to demand locations will cause global average tanker hauls (km) 2010–2050 to
be:
3 0.94 0.93 17
D5b. More Emission Control Areas may induce ship re-routing to avoid them, causing hauls (km) 2010–2030 to be: 2 1.01 1.01 14
D5c …and in 2030–2050? 4 0.99 0.97 20
D5d. Ocean Routing and operating measures to reduce carbon emissions, will cause hauls (km) 2010–2030 to be: 2 0.97 0.95 17
D5e …and in 2030–2050? 3 0.96 0.96 13
D5f. Multi-sourcing to ensure secure energy supplies, will cause hauls (km) 2010–2050 to be: 2 0.97 0.96 10
D6. How will solely the driver shown affect specific average voyage lengths of wet bulk hauls (km)?
D6a. Due to a Canadian NW Passage created by Arctic ice melt, average voyage lengths NE Asia-West Europe (km) 2010–2050 will
be:
5 0.87 0.85 9
D6b. Due to a Russian NE Passage arising from ice melt, average NE Asia- West Europe voyage lengths (km) 2010–2050 will be: 5 0.85 0.83 11
D6c. Due to an enlarged Panama Canal, NE Asia-USEC voyage lengths (km) averaged over all routes used 2010–2030 will be: 3 0.92 0.92 7
D6d…and in 2030–2050? 5 0.94 0.93 17
D6e. Due to ship re-routing to avoid piracy caused by droughts and failed states, voyage lengths (km) NE Asia-West Europe averaged
over all routes 2010–2050 will be:
4 1.06 1.05 5
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global oil consumption could satisfy a 250% increase in industrial
output in developing economies to 2050. However, ceteris paribus,
with expected energy intensity reducing quicker in non-OECD
economies (η¼2.9% CAR) than in OECD economies (η¼2.1%
CAR, EM, 2012) current oil consumption levels could support
trebled output in developing economies by 2050.
4.2. Bunker price and shipping market changes
Regarding the impact of bunker price changes on wet bulk
freight rates, considered mean panel estimates of the short run
spot freight rate elasticity for oil in relation to doubled real bunker
fuel prices imply 19.2% reduction in demand. Coupled with a long
run elasticity estimate of 0.216 these findings imply a tanker
market relatively unresponsive to bunker price changes. Market
based measures to influence shipping emissions would be rela-
tively ineffectual in both the short and long term. Very substantial
bunker fuel levies would be required to significantly impact freight
rates, even ignoring cost pass-through effects to import and final
market prices. However, if operators could not avoid bunker fuel
levies, they offer policy makers high revenue-raising potential.
Expectations of increased total global wet bulk freight work
attributable solely to increased demand for water carriers (η¼11%,
Table 6) and an enlarged Panama Canal (α¼3%, β¼3%) are logical.
Counter-intuitive increases attributed to rising demand for LNG
(η¼4%) are best discarded, as panellists probably assumed that
“tanker flows” embraced liquid gas carriage, omitted here. Tanker
freight work reductions due to EEDI regulations (η¼11%),
nuclear power (η¼4%) and shorter Arctic sea-routes (α¼2%)
imply neutral net effects from the drivers listed.
Panellists expected oil pipelines to increasingly reduce the
proportions of US oil imports moved in ships (α¼7%,
β¼12%, Table 7) as oil pipelines link the US to Canadian tar
sands. The expected proportion of European oil imports moved in
ships would reduce, due to more MEG-Europe MEG-Russia oil
pipelines (α¼4%, β¼8%). Oil pipelines MEG-China and MEG-
Russia will also reduce the proportion of China's oil imports
moved in ships (α¼4%, β¼4%).
4.3. Haul lengths
Taken individually, no single driver was perceived as radically
impacting voyage lengths globally but cumulatively, their impacts
would mount. By 2050, predicted shortening of tanker haul
lengths to counter rising bunker costs (η¼7%, Table 8), ocean
routing (η¼9%), multi-sourcing to ensure secure energy sup-
plies (η¼4%) and initial possible ECA-avoidance followed by
later acceptance (η¼2%) imply cumulative reductions of 22%.
Drivers affecting specific average voyage lengths included N.E.
Asia–W. Europe hauls shortened by a Canadian N.W. Passage
created by Arctic ice melt (η¼15%) and a Russian N.E. Passage
(η¼17%). An enlarged Panama Canal shortens hauls (α¼8%,
β¼6%) but ship re-routing to avoid piracy caused by droughts
and failed states would lengthen N.E. Asia–W. Europe hauls
(η¼5%).
Interestingly, work published after these Delphi surveys com-
menced (Mander et al., 2012) estimated that in 2006 oil and oil
products generated 34% of UK shipping's freight work but 68% of
UK CO2 emissions, explained by oil products transport in smaller
fuel-inefficient ships which require auxiliary boilers to keep
cargoes viscose. Although the Delphi surveys reported did not
consider the size of ship deployed, or focus explicitly on their
emissions, binding obligations to reduce CO2 emissions made
outside the maritime sector may impact it very significantly.
Commitments to 80% reductions by 2050 imply radical strategies
to realise them which include decarbonisation scenarios focused
on “higher carbon capture and storage” or more bioenergy renew-
ables based on “higher energy efficiency, more renewable energy”
(Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2011). Both imply
dramatic reductions in shipping freight work by 2050 with
shipment of biofuels rather than fossil fuels, although some oil
imports remain (Mander et al., 2012). CCC central estimates show
UK domestic crude inward oil shipments reducing from 33 Mtpa in
2006 to 7 Mtpa in 2050, imports reducing from 43 to 12 Mtpa,
domestic petroleum products movements reducing from 13 to
3 Mtpa and imports from 35 to 18 Mtpa.
The maritime industry is notoriously conservative, which may
explain the conservative Delphi expectations of business as usual
reported above. However, if national commitments to emissions
reduction are to be realised (Committee on Climate Change(CCC),
2011; Mander et al., 2012) or to guide other states, critical policy
issues relate to how quickly and effectively energy officials can
transform fossil fuel intolerance and reducing energy intensities
into acceptable policies to achieve ambitious emissions commit-
ments. For example, after 2016, much demand for heavy marine
fuel oils will shift to middle distillates due to MARPOL Annex VI
regulations on marine fuel (IMO, 2013). However, to achieve UK
shipping carbon emissions targets by 2050 will require radical
combinations of supply chain network optimisation, social and
industrial advances, and major technical advances in ship design,
management and operation.
5. Discussion and conclusion
Delphi studies potentially share criticisms which taint most
behavioural forecasts (Stopford 2009, 739). To discourage respon-
dents from offering precise but wrong answers which might appear
more authoritative than vague right answers, this work offered no
precise response categories. Similarly recruitment of a panel incor-
porating many early career specialists reduced the likelihood of
status quo bias whereby responses may be coloured by implicit
assumptions that past trends and institutional frameworks will
endure. To avoid replication of herding instincts observed in
shipping cycles which drive optimism during peaks and pessimism
during troughs, panellists were offered no statements about short
term developments. If all panellists are uncertain, similar predic-
tions may arise creating apparent but incorrect consensus. Inter-
estingly, the perceptions of early career specialists mirrored those of
established specialists, and both were very conservative compared
with recent UK energy policy proposals (CCC, 2011). This implies
that to achieve ambitious energy objectives will also require
extensive education, publicity and possibly market interventions
targeting both early career and established maritime professionals
to inform, coax and persuade them away from Business As Usual
expectations. To target career entrants, advanced education in
maritime business and related disciplines could usefully feature
case studies including extreme scenarios requiring zero carbon
emissions. Action research cases which require participants to
ponder and formulate operational responses to extreme policy
restraints should embrace the implications of accelerated carbon
reduction policies. To better inform experienced maritime practi-
tioners about policy developments and future prospects requires
targeted and effective dissemination of regular factsheets from
national governments and supra-national bodies such as IMO.
In this research, if conservative opinions do imply universal
uncertainty, this phenomenon endorses the complexities of long
term forecasting in volatile markets. Policy makers must heed
this volatility before imposing for example ad valorem levies to
reduce shipping CO2 emissions. Expressions of forecast certainty
in this environment are irrational but a well-presented alternative
strategy might influence specialists’ attitudes and eventually
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their behaviour. Trade associations, professional bodies and gov-
ernments must work together to provide detailed examples of
operational best practice, and regular briefings for practitioners to
offer practical advice on measures to reduce emissions and
operating costs, plan investments and implement technical mea-
sures to achieve emissions reductions. To enhance engagement
with maritime professionals, an external agency or specialist
group within IMO is required to promote monitoring and contin-
uous improvements in standards beyond ship design and opera-
tional compliance.
Overall, panellists expected global tanker demand to 2050 to
rise only modestly despite increasing demands to ship more water,
avoid pirates and ECAs, and satiate rapidly developing economies.
Demand offsets include shorter sea-routes via Arctic passages and
upgraded canals, reducing haul lengths attributable to localised
sourcing and more efficient ship operating plans to reduce carbon
emissions, reducing oil intensity, and modal shifts to pipelines
which present decision regulators for policy makers. Future work
might investigate whether sudden unexpected supply disruptions,
regulatory initiatives or technological developments might be
required to reinforce changes in for example bunker costs and
levies to influence shippers' margins sufficiently to stimulate this
very conservative industry to embrace more radical emission
reduction policies. Proactive policies are required to research the
impact of re-routing, re-sourcing, mode shift and production
upgrades on tanker emissions. Post-hoc, critical incident analysis
of the behavioural impacts of dynamic supply, regulatory and
technological developments on tanker movements is required to
formulate optimal emissions reduction policies.
Perceptions of modest global change coupled with reducing
energy intensities in advanced economies imply dramatic shifts in
tanker market shares towards developing economies. Perceptions of
accelerating global preferences for pipelines over maritime flows
and increasing demand for nuclear power, combined with reducing
tolerance of fossil fuels in energy production may signify systemic
post-oil dependence behavioural shifts. However, evidence pre-
sented here implies that real behavioural change will require active
policy driven statutory emissions reduction commitments rather
than passive reliance on growing fossil fuel intolerance. Longer
term, shifts in the economics of tanker movements may depend on
unpredictable factors such as ice-strengthened hull availability, the
incidence and political fall-out of oil spills incidents in Arctic waters,
and the accessibility and cost of pipelines from Russia and MEG. The
extent to which legislation or other regulatory measures will be
required will depend on the effectiveness of carbon emission
reduction targets. National or regional level interventions might
include for example Emission Control Areas, port state controls or
environmental and land use planning regulations around refineries.
Findings that oil hauls lengthen if ships re-route to avoid ECAs and
piracy underpin the need to coordinate international action through
IMO and other UN agencies to find and address the root causes of
piracy, and to minimise the number of failed states. Similarly, to be
effective in cutting global rather than local emissions, ECA designa-
tions require agreements between adjacent regions and jurisdic-
tions to minimise circumnavigation. Future oil tanker flows will
vary, perhaps unpredictably, with regional growth rates, dynamic
oil sourcing policies and socio-political drivers such as piracy.
Future forecasts of tanker movements might intertwine with the
formulation and evaluation of policy strategies to manage each.
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